

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA		✓		
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/CIS				
20	NOIAF	✓			
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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

STAT

Executive Secretary

5/24/82


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



May 22, 1982

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Interagency Group No. 18

TO: OVP - Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke
 NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
 CIA -
 Defense - Col. John Stanford
 JCS - Maj. Dennis Stanley
 OMB - Mr. William Schneider
 Treasury - Mr. David Pickford
 AID - Mr. Gerald Pagano
 ICA - Ms. Teresa Collins

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SUBJECT: NSSD 8-82 - Interagency Group Meeting on the Horn
 of Africa, May 19, 1982

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The NSC requested that the study paper be recast into a format paralleling that used for NSSD 4, and proposed that a small drafting group be convened to conduct a line-by-line review of the study paper and summary as well as a draft NSDD. Both points were agreed.

DOD/ISA offered the view that the short-run threat from Ethiopia to Sudan and Somalia is more serious than the study indicates, and that a more active approach toward Ethiopia (along the lines of Charge Roberts' retrospective cable--Addis Ababa 1663 140708Z May 82--and including military options) should be considered at the national level. If there is a gap between what must be done to achieve our policy objectives and the resources available, this problem should be highlighted to the policymakers before further resource commitments are made to facilities in the Horn countries. JCS stated that it did not necessarily agree that there were viable military options to defend Somalia with U.S. forces, and that the U.S. needs a range of options between going in militarily or giving up. State and NSC noted that such options include using a combination of security assistance to states threatened by Ethiopia, better coordination with allies to squeeze resources going to Ethiopia, direct communication/warnings to Ethiopia, symbolic

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
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uses of U.S. forces such as visits and exercises, and the Ethiopian insurgent movements, the pros and cons of all of which are covered in the study. It was also noted that alternative approaches should also deal with the likely consequences of the proposed actions.

OMB questioned the lack of specificity in the study on proposed assistance levels for Sudan. Treasury noted that the paper correctly identified several broad economic policy issues raised by the Sudan case, but suggested that these problems could be addressed on a country-by-country basis. It was agreed that these aspects of Sudan's problems were somewhat beyond the terms of reference for the Horn IG, but a recommendation might be made for a separate interagency effort to find a solution to the Sudanese economic problem.

ACTION ASSIGNMENTS:

1. State will recast the study paper in the format used for NSSD 4.
2. Other participants should provide to State by close of business Friday, May 21, specific proposals for revisions of the language in the study paper or alternative recommendations.
3. State will convene a small drafting group during the week of May 24 to go over the texts of the study paper, summary report and a draft NSDD. Issue papers will be assigned on any inter-agency issues developed in this process.
4. Other member agencies desiring to participate in the drafting group are to notify State (AF/E -- Curt Kamman or Dick Baker, 632-9742).



L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

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